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Abstract—The recent technological advances and the recent
changes in the daily human activities increased the production
and sharing of data. In the ecosystem of interconnected systems,
data can be circulated among systems for various reasons.
This could lead to exchange of private or sensitive informa-
tion between entities. Data Sanitisation involves processes and
practices that remove sensitive and private information from
documents before sharing them with entities that should not be
exposed to the removed information. This paper presents the
design and development of a data sanitisation and redaction
solution for a Cyber Threat Intelligence sharing platform. The
Data Sanitisation and Redaction Plugin has been designed with
the purpose of operating as a plugin for the ECHO Project’s
Early Warning System platform and enhancing its operative
capabilities during information sharing. This plugin aims to
provide automated security and privacy-based controls to the
concept of CTI sharing over a ticketing system. The plugin has
been successfully tested and the results are presented in this
paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in networks and other technological advances
(e.g. advances which have led to more devices connecting
to the internet) as well as the radical changes that society
is experiencing (e.g. increased use of social media and in-
creased remote working due to the COVID-19 pandemic) have
resulted to the increased production and sharing of data. In
the ecosystem of interconnected systems that constitutes the
cyber realm, data can be circulated among systems with dif-
ferent considerations and policies on the issues of information
sharing, processing and privacy. This could lead to exchange
of private or sensitive information between entities; with the
information reaching entities that do not (or should not) need
to obtain it.
Data Sanitisation involves processes and practices that
remove sensitive and private information from documents,
before sharing them with entities that should not be exposed
to the redacted content. At its early stages, when the data
were displayed on paper, early sanitisation techniques started
as printing a black opaque ink tape over the portions of texts
during the declassification and dissemination of classified doc-
uments. The main concept has been preserved, even though it
is also now being applied to digital information. In the context
of cybersecurity, information may include critical and sensitive
information regarding an organisation. The information of
vulnerabilities, weaknesses and even enumeration of related
cybersecurity incidents can be critical in terms of open-source
intelligence. Moreover, sharing of cybersecurity incidents can
be proven dangerous when including malicious data inside a
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) token. Uploaded and included
documents must be scanned thoroughly before being shared
with other organisations. As CTI sharing platforms are used
by security experts, and ideally they are assumed to be trusted
environments, these platforms can also be exploited for the
dissemination of malicious data.
This paper presents the design and development of a data
sanitisation and redaction solution for a CTI sharing plat-
form. The Data Sanitisation and Redaction Plugin (DSR) has
been designed with the purpose of operating as a plugin
for the ECHO (European network of Cybersecurity centres
and competence Hub for innovation and Operations) Project’s
Early Warning System (EWS) platform, and enhancing its
operative capabilities during information sharing . The EWS
is a platform for secured collaborative information sharing of
cyber-relevant information [1]. This plugin aims to provide
automated security and privacy-based controls to the concept
of CTI sharing over the ticketing system. A ticket in the EWS
encompasses CTI information with the creation of attributes
and facets. These attributes can contain scripts, IP addresses,
user credentials and malicious files and indicators. Before
sharing a ticket on the EWS, the user of the system must
ensure that private information and attributes are not included
in the ticket. In addition, harmful scripts, executables, unau-
thorised downloads and injections can easily be overlooked.
Hence, data sanitisation and redaction steps are required in the
process, before sharing the tickets. Our proposed solution can
successfully identify and isolate aforementioned threats and
remove sensitive data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Next
section presents the related work and background research.
Section 3 introduces the DSR plugin and describes the main
components. Section 4 includes the test results and evaluation
of the study. Finally, conclusions and future work are given in
the last section.
II. RELATED WORK
Sanitisation and redaction of data have been under the
microscope of the research community for more than two
decades. Initially introduced as an answer to security and
privacy risks associated to data mining techniques and machine
learning algorithms that were used to extract sensitive knowl-
edge from publicly available information [2]. Early research on
data sanitisation discusses distributed transactional databases
and addresses the problem of maximising the utilisation of data
with the use of sensitive association rules where sensitive and
private data are being redacted [3]. In the relevant literature,
various privacy preserving models are presented towards data
and/or knowledge protection through sanitisation [4], [5]. The
existence of multiple sanitisation solutions (and the lack of
commonly agreed practises can be considered another added
weight to the fact that there is not a common solution for
sharing the cyber threat data yet [6].
Cyber security solutions like SIEM tools, Firewalls, IDSs
and IPSs have been significantly improved over the years
offering now advanced endpoint, cloud control and protection.
However, it has been proven that they can further upgrade
their performance by taking advantage of free or paid Threat
Intelligent Feeds [7]. Those are up-to-date streams of data
related to current or potential security threats. Hence, like in
any other exchange of sensitive data, the security and privacy
aspects of sharing CTI have been also a concern. Related
extensive research has taken place since 2015, especially with
the development of Structured Threat Information Expression
(STIX) [8]. The models that are integrating with STIX are
developed and utilised in the research community as it is the
de-facto standard for sharing CTI [9], [10].
In [11] and [12], security analysis of CTI sharing with third
party analysis platforms over cloud are presented. Both studies
address the studies conducted towards this aim in the EU
project of Collaborative and Confidential Information Sharing
and Analysis for Cyber Protection (C3ISP). Based on the
C3ISP framework, where four pilot projects offered a wide
range of use cases to test security and trust requirements prior
to CTI sharing, [13] proposed a five-level trust model for
a cloud-edge based data sharing infrastructure. The results,
although slightly premature, showed that both data analytics
and data sanitisation can be performed while testing several
deployment models. Moreover, a blockchain-based network is
prototyped and shown in [14] as a solution for CTI sharing
platforms suffering from poorly defined trust barriers and data
privacy issues between the partners.
A. Data Sanitisation under the scope of the GDPR
In May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [15] was enacted across the EU and with this, came
an obligation on organisations to process data securely and
to safeguard any private date, called ”Personal Data” (PI)
(Article 4(1), GDPR) by restricting processing and putting
in place strong security protection around any sharing of
data. GDPR centres around 7 data protection principles; data
processing must be (1) fair, transparent and lawful; (2) data
should be processed for a specific, explicit purpose only;
(3) minimisation, only relevant data should be collected; (4)
accurate; (5) storage limitation, stored only for period needed,
ideally in a anonymised or sanitised format from the start;
(6) Secure, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of the
data is maintained and safeguarded; and (7) Accountability,
an obligation to integrate measures that facilitates being able
to demonstrate compliance. These principles were devised
to ensure only necessary and relevant data is processed and
to safeguard the individual’s whose data is being processed.
This, in terms of the CTI sharing platform, will be achieved
by ensuring that the sanitisation process will also remove or
redact any PI from the collection of CTI tickets and warnings
to ensure compliance with GDPR before this is uploaded to
the EWS.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE DSR PLUGIN
This section presents the high level overview of the pro-




• EWS Core Communicator
The high level architecture of the plugin is shown in Figure
1. Further analysis produces eight components that describe
the operation of the plugin in detail. These are explained
below:
• Core – The core of the plugin is responsible for sending
and receiving updates to and from the classes that the
plugin is implementing. It is the main orchestrator of the
whole software.
• Parser – With this class, the received ticket is formed
into a Data Transfer Object (DTO); the parser supports
functionality for the formats of JSON, STIX and IOC.
The parser transforms the ticket into data that can be
processed by the functions of the plugin.
• DTO – The DTO is the data structure that is transferred
between classes. The DTO is formed by the parser when
the Web hook is captured from the E-EWS core. Once
formed, it is transferred to the sanitisation component.
After the conclusion of the sanitisation process, the DTO
is requested by the core and is delivered to the redaction
stage where information will be redacted, if needed.
• Sanitiser – Once the DTO is sent from the core to the
sanitisation component, the processes of the Sanitiser
check and remove certain properties of a malicious object.
The implemented operations of this sanitiser are a script
checker and a downloader detector, while the functional-
ity is complemented by the use of an external antivirus
interface, which in that case is the Virustotal API.
• Redactor – This class applies the redac-
tion/anonymisation techniques to the data. The Redactor
receives the DTO and with a use of regular expressions
it offers capabilities in removing private information
(e.g. SSNs, emails, phone numbers, credit cards etc.),
according to the user’s policies and decisions on
redacting information.
• Configuration Checker – This class checks the configu-
ration that the user chose before proceeding to redacting
information.
• Report Generator – After the processes of sanitisation
and redaction have been concluded, the core feeds the
data to generate a report for the user to evaluate the
redaction process, and also to feed vector data into the
machine learning engine.
• Machine Learning Engine – The machine learning
engine is utilising the data of the generated report in order
to train the redaction and sanitisation process after every
time that a ticket has been received and processed.
The communication between the classes of the DSR pulgin
for the sanitisation and redaction processes are given in Figures
2 and 3 respectively. For the sanitisation process, the Plugin
Core receives the message and exchanges it with the Sanitation
Class in order to provide the necessary sanitisation process,
as previously described. The redaction process requires the
exchange of the DTO between Plugin Core and each one of
the classes named after the components, i.e. the Configuration
Checker, Redactor, Report Generator and Machine Learning
Engine. For each one of the exchanges of the DTO, the classes
return and update to the Plugin Core with the actions provided
by them, according to their function.
A. DSR Plugin’s Main Features
The DSR plugin can successfully identify and iso-
late/neutralise any of the following:
• Malicious Scripts (e.g. JavaScript, VBScript, HTML,
Perl, C++, ActiveX and Flash scripts)in ticket attachments
and attributes,
• SQL scripts that are included in tickets,
• Malicious URLs and links in a file that could result to
downloading malicious files,
• Tickets that include malicious headers or parts of mali-
cious code as evidence.
For the purpose of privacy protection and for securing
sensitive data, DSR can remove information in tickets that





• Date formats for the removal of information such as the
Date of Birth,
• Number formats that is related to credit card numbers,
phone numbers, SSNs, etc.
Depending on the needs of the users, different regular
expressions can be applied to match the different criteria that
analysts use and the requirements and specification brought
by different occasions (e.g. the different structure of a Social
Number or an address in each countries).
B. Functional Requirements of the DSR Plugin
Based on the aforementioned objectives, DSR has been
developed under the scope of the following functional require-
ments:
FR1: The attributes of the tickets must be investigated for
IP addresses to prompt the user.
FR2: The attributes and the ticket description must be
searched for email patterns to prompt the user.
FR3: The attributes and the ticket description must be
searched for SSN patterns to prompt the user.
FR4: The attributes must be searched for credit card number
patters to prompt the user.
FR5: The users must be warned about date information such
as Date of Birth to comply with privacy preserving regulations.
FR6: URLs must be avoided in a ticket unless they are a
part of the CTI.
FR7: The users must be able to create new regex and
patterns depending on their needs of CTI.
FR8: JavaScript, VBScript, HTML, Perl, C++, ActiveX and
Flash scripts must be detected automatically and removed.
FR9: SQL Injections must be detected and automatically
removed.
FR10: Fileless malware and malware downloaders, hidden
in URLs and scripts, must be detected and automatically
removed.
FR11: Malwares included in CTI should not be in an
executable condition and should be neutralised in a way that
the malware remains analysable.
FR12: The results of searches and sanitisations must be
available to the users through a status update over tickets.
FR13: A mechanism for escaping scripts and texts should
be provided when a script needs to be shared
The sanitisation component of the plugin aims to auto-
matically remove and wipe malicious data from the cyber
threat intelligence data, provided as DTO objects which are
defined by the core of the warning system. The redaction
plugin automatically redacts private data from the document
and additionally trains the Machine Learning engine. The EWS
Core communicator is an interface to the EWS Core for the
Web Hooks and SDK integration.
C. DSR Plugin’s Use Cases
As a result of the requirements and the development plans
of the DSR, the following use case where designed and used
for the evaluation of the plugin:
• A user that can check for stolen information.
• A user that can identify dates and redact these date data.
• A user that can redact according to the privacy preserving
policies and regulations.
• A user that can the header of the malware to neutralise.
• A user that can detect a malware downloader.
• A user that can detect and sanitise XSS injections.
• A user that can detect and sanitise SQL injections.
• A user that can detect and identify scripts.
Fig. 1. Class Diagram of DSR
Fig. 2. Sequence Diagram for the sanitisation process of DSR
IV. TESTING AND EVALUATION
For the preliminary testing of the plugin, a CTI dataset of
300 EWS tickets were created. During the creation of this
dataset, XSS and SQL injection scripts were randomly selected
from the following resources [16], [17]. In addition to this,
to create Personally Identifiable information on tickets, the
python library Faker version 3.0.1 was utilised [18]. These
tickets were fed to the plugin as webhooks coming from
the EWS system and each one of them was classified either
“malicious” or “privacy threatening tickets”. These results are
provided in Table I. Rigorous testing of the plugin which will
be enhanced by machine learning classification methods will
Fig. 3. Sequence Diagram for the redaction process of DSR
resume as a future work.
TABLE I
PRELIMINARY TEST RESULTS FOR 300 TICKETS
TP TN FP FN Acc
Privacy Tests 100 188 12 0 0.96
Malicious Scripts Test 195 86 26 5 0.90
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a data sanitisation and redaction solution
for sharing cyber threat intelligence data. Our solution has
been implemented as a plugin to the E-EWS CTI ticket
sharing platform in the ECHO project. This plugin provides
an automated security and privacy preserving controls before
sharing the tickets.
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